基于简化Bow-tie模型的LOPA场景辨识与筛选方法

doi:10.16085/j.issn.1000-6613.2020-2385

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

场景筛选是确保保护层分析（LOPA）有效性的关键，为准确筛选出需要进行LOPA分析的场景，本文在Bow-tie模型的基础上，提出了基于最大可信场景的场景辨识及筛选方法。首先，利用事故树与事件树建立以损失事件为中心的简化Bow-tie模型辨识分析对象的潜在危害，得到危害场景列表；其次，以最大可信场景辨识方法为基础对场景筛选方法进行改进，利用改进后的筛选方法对危害场景列表进行筛选，确定场景列表中最终需要进行LOPA分析的场景；最后，将此方法应用于某商储库10⁵m³原油储罐风险分析的场景筛选中，并利用风险分析筛选软件（RAST）来验证所提方法的可行性和有效性。结果表明：所提方法能够较好地考虑设备实际运行情况，且根据企业内部的风险标准进行筛选，得到的实际筛选结果对后续的LOPA分析更具指导意义。

关键词: 石油, 安全, 模型简化, 场景筛选, Bow-tie模型

Abstract:

Scenarios screening is the key to ensure the effectiveness of layer of protection analysis (LOPA). To screen out the scenarios accurately which need to carry out the LOPA analysis, this paper proposes a scenarios identification and screening method based on the most credible scene on the basis of Bow-tie model. First, use the Fault tree and Event tree to establish a simplified Bow-tie model which centers on loss events to identify the potential hazards of the analysis object, and obtain a list of hazard scenarios. Secondly, improve the scenario screening method based on the most credible scenario identification method. Use the improved screening method to filter the list of hazardous scenarios. Simultaneously determine the scenarios that need carry on LOPA analysis in the scenarios list. Finally, apply this method in the 10⁵m3 crude oil storage tank of a reserve storage and use risk analysis screening tool (RAST) to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method. The results show that the proposed method can better consider the actual operation of the equipment and screen scenarios according to the internal risk standards of the enterprise, which makes the actual screening results obtained more instructive for the subsequent LOPA analysis.

Key words: petroleum, safety, model reduction, scenarios screening, Bow-tie model

中图分类号:

X913.4

刘美晨, 刘鹏, 王海清, 刘荫. 基于简化Bow-tie模型的LOPA场景辨识与筛选方法[J]. 化工进展, 2021, 40(11): 5988-5997.

LIU Meichen, LIU Peng, WANG Haiqing, LIU Yin. Research on LOPA scenarios identification and screening based on simplified Bow-tie model[J]. Chemical Industry and Engineering Progress, 2021, 40(11): 5988-5997.

图/表 13

参考文献 19

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孔尺寸	范围	适用设备
小	0~1/4英寸	管道、压力容器、泵、储罐
中	1/4英寸~2英寸	管道、压力容器、泵、压缩机、储罐
大	2~6英寸	管道、压力容器、泵、压缩机、储罐
破裂	＞6英寸	管道、压力容器、储罐

孔尺寸	范围	适用设备
小	0~1/4英寸	管道、压力容器、泵、储罐
中	1/4英寸~2英寸	管道、压力容器、泵、压缩机、储罐
大	2~6英寸	管道、压力容器、泵、压缩机、储罐
破裂	＞6英寸	管道、压力容器、储罐

场景编号	初始事件	损失事件	后果	初始事件发生频率/a^-1	场景后果发生频率/a^-1	后果严重度
1.1.1	人员维修失误，阀门法兰未拧紧	储罐小孔泄漏	轻微环境污染	1×10^-1	9.99×10^-2	A
1.1.2	人员维修失误，阀门法兰未拧紧		闪火/池火	1×10^-1	1.13×10^-4	A
1.2.1	垫圈磨损		轻微环境污染	1×10^-2	9.99×10^-3	A
1.2.2	垫圈磨损		闪火/池火	1×10^-2	1.13×10^-5	A
2.1.1	附属管道失效发生轻微泄漏	储罐中孔泄漏	轻微环境污染	1×10^-3	9.94×10^-4	A
2.1.2	附属管道失效发生轻微泄漏		闪火/池火	1×10^-3	6.17×10^-6	B
2.2.1	底板或罐壁腐蚀导致储罐轻微穿孔		环境污染	1×10^-2	9.94×10^-3	A
2.2.2	底板或罐壁腐蚀导致储罐轻微穿孔		闪火/池火	1×10^-2	6.17×10^-5	B
3.1.1	附属管道失效发生泄漏	储罐大孔泄漏	毒性泄漏	1×10^-4	8.00×10^-5	C
3.1.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-4	1.86×10^-5	D
3.1.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-4	1.35×10^-6	D
3.2.1	底板或罐壁腐蚀导致储罐穿孔		毒性泄漏	5×10^-3	4.00×10^-3	C
3.2.2			闪火/池火	5×10^-3	9.3×10^-3	D
3.2.3			蒸气云爆炸	5×10^-3	6.75×10^-4	E

场景编号	初始事件	损失事件	后果	初始事件发生频率/a^-1	场景后果发生频率/a^-1	后果严重度
1.1.1	人员维修失误，阀门法兰未拧紧	储罐小孔泄漏	轻微环境污染	1×10^-1	9.99×10^-2	A
1.1.2	人员维修失误，阀门法兰未拧紧		闪火/池火	1×10^-1	1.13×10^-4	A
1.2.1	垫圈磨损		轻微环境污染	1×10^-2	9.99×10^-3	A
1.2.2	垫圈磨损		闪火/池火	1×10^-2	1.13×10^-5	A
2.1.1	附属管道失效发生轻微泄漏	储罐中孔泄漏	轻微环境污染	1×10^-3	9.94×10^-4	A
2.1.2	附属管道失效发生轻微泄漏		闪火/池火	1×10^-3	6.17×10^-6	B
2.2.1	底板或罐壁腐蚀导致储罐轻微穿孔		环境污染	1×10^-2	9.94×10^-3	A
2.2.2	底板或罐壁腐蚀导致储罐轻微穿孔		闪火/池火	1×10^-2	6.17×10^-5	B
3.1.1	附属管道失效发生泄漏	储罐大孔泄漏	毒性泄漏	1×10^-4	8.00×10^-5	C
3.1.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-4	1.86×10^-5	D
3.1.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-4	1.35×10^-6	D
3.2.1	底板或罐壁腐蚀导致储罐穿孔		毒性泄漏	5×10^-3	4.00×10^-3	C
3.2.2			闪火/池火	5×10^-3	9.3×10^-3	D
3.2.3			蒸气云爆炸	5×10^-3	6.75×10^-4	E

场景编号	初始事件	损失事件	后果	初始事件发生频率/a^-1	场景后果发生频率/a^-1	后果严重度
4.1.1	外部火灾导致储罐结构性失效	储罐破裂	毒性泄漏	1×10^-4	8.00×10^-5	C
4.1.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-4	1.86×10^-5	D
4.1.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-4	1.35×10^-6	E
4.2.1	底部/罐壁腐蚀或焊缝质量问题导致储罐失效		毒性泄漏	5×10^-4	4.00×10^-4	C
4.2.2			闪火/池火	5×10^-4	9.3×10^-5	D
4.2.3			蒸气云爆炸	5×10^-4	6.75×10^-6	E
4.3.1	外部冲击/负载		毒性泄漏	1×10^-3	8.00×10^-4	C
4.3.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-3	1.86×10^-4	D
4.3.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-3	1.35×10^-5	E
4.4.1	自然灾害		毒性泄漏	1×10^-5	8.00×10^-6	C
4.4.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-5	1.86×10^-6	D
4.4.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-5	1.35×10^-7	E
5.1.1	人员操作失误	储罐溢流	毒性泄漏	1×10^-1/次	2.68×10^-2	C
5.1.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-1/次	1.15×10^-2	C
5.1.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-1/次	1.94×10^-3	D
5.2.1	BPCS液位控制失效		毒性泄漏	1×10^-1	9.60×10^-3	C
5.2.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-1	2.23×10^-3	C
5.2.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-1	1.62×10^-4	D
5.3.1	中央排水系统故障，高液位储罐排水不畅		毒性泄漏	1×10^-2	6.56×10^-3	C
5.3.2			闪火/池火	1×10^-2	1.53×10^-3	C
5.3.3			蒸气云爆炸	1×10^-2	1.11×10^-4	D